Curtis Chipman, Fay Chipman v. Janice Miller, Dana Anderson, and Kim Anderson : Brief of Appellee by Utah Court of Appeals
Brigham Young University Law School
BYU Law Digital Commons
Utah Court of Appeals Briefs
1996
Curtis Chipman, Fay Chipman v. Janice Miller,
Dana Anderson, and Kim Anderson : Brief of
Appellee
Utah Court of Appeals
Follow this and additional works at: https://digitalcommons.law.byu.edu/byu_ca2
Part of the Law Commons
Original Brief Submitted to the Utah Court of Appeals; digitized by the Howard W. Hunter Law
Library, J. Reuben Clark Law School, Brigham Young University, Provo, Utah; machine-generated
OCR, may contain errors.
Craig M. Snyder; Leslie W. Slaugh; Howard, Lewis and Petersen; Attorneys for Appellees.
Gordon Duval; Jeff Buhman; Duval, Hansen, Witt and Morley; Attorney for Appellants
This Brief of Appellee is brought to you for free and open access by BYU Law Digital Commons. It has been accepted for inclusion in Utah Court of
Appeals Briefs by an authorized administrator of BYU Law Digital Commons. Policies regarding these Utah briefs are available at
http://digitalcommons.law.byu.edu/utah_court_briefs/policies.html. Please contact the Repository Manager at hunterlawlibrary@byu.edu with
questions or feedback.
Recommended Citation
Brief of Appellee, Chipman v. Miller, No. 960194 (Utah Court of Appeals, 1996).
https://digitalcommons.law.byu.edu/byu_ca2/128
IN THE UTAH COURT OF APPEALS 
UTAH COURT OF APPEALS 
UTAH B R , E F 
DOCUMENT 
KFU 
50 
A10 
CURTIS CHIPMAN and FAY 
CHIPMAN, 
Plaintiffs-Appellees, 
vs, 
JANICE MILLER, DANA ANDERSON 
and KIM ANDERSON, 
Defendants-Appellants, 
DOCKET NO QilMW^i- rf 
Case No. 960194-CA 
Oral Argument Priority 15 
BRIEF OF APPELLEES 
APPEAL FROM THE FINAL DECREE OF THE FOURTH JUDICIAL 
COURT OF UTAH COUNTY, THE HONORABLE GUY R. BURNINGHAM 
CRAIG M. SNYDER and 
LESLIE W. SLAUGH, for: 
HOWARD, LEWIS & PETERSEN 
120 East 300 North 
Provo, Utah 84 601 
ATTORNEYS FOR APPELLEES 
GORDON DUVAL 
JEFF BUHMAN 
DUVAL, HANSEN, WITT & MORLEY 
110 South Main Street 
Pleasant Grove, UT 84062 
ATTORNEY FOR APPELLANTS 
FILED 
Utah Court of Appeals 
AUG - 7 1996 
Marilyn M. Branch 
Cterkot the Court 
TABLE OF CONTENTS 
TABLE OF AUTHORITIES ii 
JURISDICTION 1 
ISSUES PRESENTED 1 
DETERMINATIVE STATUTES AND RULES 2 
STATEMENT OF THE CASE 3 
A. Nature Of The Case 3 
B. Course Of Proceedings And Disposition Below . . . . 3 
C. Statement Of Facts 4 
SUMMARY OF ARGUMENT 7 
ARGUMENT 8 
POINT I 
DEFENDANTS WERE THE PREVAILING PARTIES ON THE 
ATTORNEY FEE ISSUES, AND THE AWARD OF FEES IS 
SUPPORTED BY THE EVIDENCE 8 
A. Defendants were the prevailing party on the 
attorney fee issue. 8 
B. Plaintiffs' Claim For Attorney Fees Was 
Without Merit 10 
C. There Is Adequate Evidence Of Bad Faith; Any 
Lack Of Sufficient Evidence Is Harmless. . . . 12 
POINT II 
PLAINTIFFS WERE NOT ENTITLED TO ATTORNEY FEES EVEN 
THOUGH THEY PREVAILED ON THEIR QUIET TITLE 
CLAIMS 16 
POINT III 
DEFENDANTS ARE ENTITLED TO DOUBLE COSTS AND 
ATTORNEY FEES FOR RESPONDING TO THIS APPEAL. . . . 20 
CONCLUSION 22 
i 
TABLE OF AUTHORITIES 
Cases Cited; 
Arnica Mutual Ins. Co. v. Schettler, 768 P.2d 950 (Utah Ct. App. 
1989) 12 
Backstrom Family Limited Partnership v. Hall, 751 P.2d 1157 (Utah 
Ct. App. 1988) 16, 21 
Baldwin v. Burton. 850 P.2d 1188 (Utah 1993) 13, 14 
Barnard v. Sutliff. 846 P.2d 1229 (Utah 1992) 15 
Cadv v. Johnson. 671 P.2d 141 (Utah 1983) 8, 12, 13 
Draper v. J. B. & R. B. Walker, Inc., 115 Utah 368, 204 P.2d 826 
(1949) 10, 12, 14-16, 18, 22 
Griffin v. New Hampshire Department of Employment Security, 370 
A.2d 278 (N.H. 1977) 20 
Hall v. Cole. 412 U.S. 1 (1973) 18 
Harkeem v. Adams. 377 A.2d 617 (N.H. 1977) 19, 20 
Highland Construction Co. v. Stevenson, 636 P.2d 1034 (Utah 
1981) 8-10 
Jack B. Parson Companies v. Nield. 751 P.2d 1131 (Utah 1988) 11, 
12, 14-16, 18, 22 
Jensen v. Bowcut, 892 P.2d 1053 (Utah Ct. App. 1995) . . . . 12 
Jeschke v. Willis, 811 P.2d 202 (Utah Ct. App. 1991). . . . 1, 13 
O'Brien v. Rush. 744 P.2d 306 (Utah Ct. App. 1987) 22 
Schlank v. Williams, 572 A.2d 101 (D.C. Ct. App. 1990) . 18, 19 
State v. Larsen. 865 P.2d 1355 (Utah 1993) 1 
Utah Department of Social Services v. Adams, 806 P.2d 1193 (Utah 
Ct. App. 1991) 22 
ii 
Statutes and Rules Cited; 
Utah Code Ann. § 78-2-2(3) (j) (Supp. 1996) 1 
Utah Code Ann. § 78-2a-3 (2) (i) (Supp. 1995) 1 
Utah Code Ann. § 78-2a-3(2)(k) (Supp. 1996) 1 
Utah Code Ann. § 78-27-56 (1992) 8, 12, 15, 17 
Utah Code Ann. § 78-40-3 (1992) 9, 11 
Utah R. App. P. 33 20 
Utah R. Civ. P. 11 2, 15 
Utah R. Prof. Con. 3.3(a)(3) 15, 22 
iii 
IN THE UTAH COURT OF APPEALS 
CURTIS CHIPMAN and FAY 
CHIPMAN, 
Plaintiffs-Appellees, 
vs. 
JANICE MILLER, DANA ANDERSON 
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Case No. 960194-CA 
Oral Argument Priority 15 
BRIEF OF APPELLEES 
JURISDICTION 
This is an appeal from a final decree in a civil action. 
Jurisdiction was conferred on the Utah Supreme Court by Utah Code 
Ann. § 78-2-2(3)(j) (Supp. 1996). This Court has pour-over 
jurisdiction under Utah Code Ann. § 78-2a-3(2)(k) (Supp. 1996). 
ISSUES PRESENTED 
1. Did the trial court err in awarding attorney fees to a 
party which prevailed in defeating the opposing claim for attorney 
fees, where the opposing claim for fees was barred by statute and 
controlling case law? The trial court's finding of bad faith must 
be affirmed unless clearly erroneous. Jeschke v. Willis, 811 P. 2d 
202, 204 (Utah Ct. App. 1991). The trial court's legal conclusions 
on the interpretation of the statute are reviewed for correctness. 
State v. Larsen. 865 P.2d 1355, 1357 (Utah 1993). 
2. Where plaintiffs entitled to an award of attorney fees 
for prevailing in a quiet title action, where defendants did not 
contest the quiet title claim after the filing of the complaint? 
This is a legal issue which is reviewed for correctness. Id. 
3. Are defendants entitled to double costs and attorney fees 
for responding to this appeal, where appellants' claims are barred 
by controlling cases and where appellants have persisted in their 
claims in bad faith? This is an original issue addressed to this 
Court. 
DETERMINATIVE STATUTES AND RULES 
Utah R. Civ. P. 11: 
Every pleading, motion, and other paper 
of a party represented by an attorney shall be 
signed by at least one attorney of record in 
his individual name who is duly licensed to 
practice in the state of Utah. The attorney's 
address also shall be stated. A party who is 
not represented by an attorney shall sign his 
pleading, motion, or other paper and state his 
address. Except when otherwise specifically 
provided by rule or statute, pleadings need 
not be verified or accompanied by affidavit. 
The rule in equity that the averments of an 
answer under oath must be overcome by the 
testimony of two witnesses or of one witness 
sustained by corroborating circumstances is 
abolished. The signature of an attorney or 
party constitutes a certification by him that 
he has read the pleading, motion, or other 
paper; that to the best of his knowledge, 
information, and belief formed after 
reasonable inquiry it is well grounded in fact 
and is warranted by existing law or a good 
faith argument for the extension, 
modification, or reversal of existing law, and 
that it is not interposed for any improper 
purpose, such as to harass or to cause 
unnecessary delay or needless increase in the 
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cost of litigation. If a pleading, motion, or 
other paper is not signed, it shall be 
stricken unless it is signed promptly after 
the omission is called to the attention of the 
pleader or movant. If a pleading, motion, or 
other paper is signed in violation of this 
rule, the court, upon motion or upon its own 
initiative, shall impose upon the person who 
signed it, a represented party, or both, an 
appropriate sanction, which may include an 
order to pay to the other party or parties the 
amount of the reasonable expenses incurred 
because of the filing of the pleading, motion, 
or other paper, including a reasonable 
attorney's fee. 
STATEMENT OF THE CASE 
A. Nature Of The Case. This is an appeal from a final 
judgment in a civil action. Plaintiffs' complaint sought to quiet 
title to real property and judgment for attorney fees. Defendants 
counterclaimed for attorney fees. 
B. Course Of Proceedings And Disposition Below. 
The statement of facts below contains a more detailed 
procedural history. This section present only a general overview. 
Plaintiffs filed their complaint March 8, 1995. (R. 6-1.l) 
Defendants answered and counterclaimed on April 18, 1995. (R. 16-
11, 21-17.) The defendants7 answers consented to Count I of 
plaintiffs7 complaint, denied the allegations supporting Count II, 
and counterclaimed for attorney fees pursuant to Rule 11 and Utah 
Code Ann. § 78-27-56 (1988). On May 1, 1995, plaintiffs filed a 
*The papers in the trial court file are organized in reverse 
chronological order, with the result that the record index numbers 
for any particular document run in reverse order. 
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"Cross Motion for Attorney's Fees." (R. 27.) Both parties 
submitted briefs and affidavits on the attorney fee issues. 
On May 25, 1995, plaintiffs requested that the trial court 
rule on the pending motions. On July 21, 1995, the trial court 
entered a ruling denying plaintiffs' request for attorney fees and 
awarding attorney fees to defendants in the amount of $484.00. (R. 
129-128.) 
On September 51, 1995, plaintiffs objected to a proposed form 
of judgment submitted by defendants (R. 138-134) and requested a 
hearing "to verify the basis of the court's decision." (R. 140.) 
The trial court held the requested hearing on October 5, 1995, and 
affirmed and explained the prior ruling. (R. 142-141.) Findings of 
Fact and Conclusions of Law (R. 146-143) and an Order and Judgment 
(R. 149-147) were entered November 16, 1995.2 Plaintiffs filed 
their Notice of Appeal on December 12, 1995. (R. 160-159.) 
C. Statement Of Facts. 
Plaintiffs present a long and disparaging statement of 
plaintiffs' version of the facts preceding this lawsuit. As 
explained in Point I.B. below, Utah cases establish that the facts 
prior to the lawsuit are irrelevant. In addition, several of the 
statements are supported only by citation to plaintiffs' legal 
20n the same day plaintiffs filed an objection to the form of 
the findings and order. (R. 153-150.) Plaintiffs withdrew that 
objection on January 10, 1996, in order to avoid any claim that the 
findings and order were not final. (R. 177.) 
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memoranda below, not by citation to any admissible evidence.3 
Defendants therefore object to but will not otherwise respond to 
the claims in plaintiffs' brief relating to the period prior to the 
lawsuit. 
Plaintiffs filed their complaint March 8, 1995, seeking to 
quiet title to certain property under the doctrine of boundary by 
acquiescence, and further seeking an award of attorney fees. 
(Complaint, copy attached.) The prayer requested an award of 
attorney fees under a two-pronged theory. First, plaintiffs 
claimed that any defense to the action would be without merit and 
that plaintiffs would be entitled to their attorney fees in that 
event pursuant to Utah Code Ann. § 78-27-56(1) (1988). Second, 
plaintiffs alleged that if they prevailed in the action, then they 
would be entitled to their reasonable attorney fees incurred in 
prosecuting the action. The complaint asserted no legal argument 
to justify the claim for a prevailing-party award of fees. 
In response to the complaint, defendants, through their 
attorney, tendered a quit claim deed from Janice Miller and a 
disclaimer of interest from the Andersons regarding the subject 
property. (R. 25-24.) Janice Miller had record title to the 
subject property; Andersons had never held nor claimed any interest 
in the subject property. (See R. 26-25; R. 89.) Plaintiffs 
3E.g., the top lines on page 7 cite to R. 71, and the top 
paragraph on page 9 cites to R. 69. These pages of the record are 
part of a memorandum filed by plaintiffs, but are not supported by 
affidavit or other admissible evidence. 
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refused to accept the quit claim deed and disclaimer unless 
defendants also paid plaintiffs' pre-complaint attorney fees. (R. 
24.) Defendants refused (id.). and defendants answered and 
counterclaimed for Rule 11 sanctions.4 (R. 16-11, 21-17.) 
After extensive briefing and additional affidavits from both 
parties, the matter was submitted to the court for decision and the 
court issued a ruling denying the plaintiffs' request for attorney 
fees and awarding defendants $484.00 in attorney fees. (R. 129-
128.) Defendants had requested attorney fees of $921.50, which 
included all the fees incurred by defendants subsequent to the 
filing of the complaint. (R. 124-123.) The court disallowed 
defendants' fees incurred in answering the complaint and awarded 
only the fees incurred in responding to plaintiffs' requests for 
attorney fees. (R. 145, 165.) The attorney fees thus awarded 
included only the following: 
Date 
5/04/95 
5/05/95 
Description 
Memorandum: opposition 
to motion (clerk) 
Review pleadings; proof 
brief 
hours 
5.50 
.75 
fee J 
$165.00 
93.75 
4Plaintiffs criticize defendants for filing their answers and 
counterclaims on April 18, 1995, and claim plaintiffs had granted 
an extension until April 21 in order to allow plaintiffs to 
consider whether to pursue their claim for attorney fees. The 
affidavit of Craig M. Snyder filed with the answers and 
counterclaims disputes plaintiffs' claim, and asserts that 
plaintiffs' counsel stated, on April 18, that plaintiffs intended 
to pursue their claim for attorney fees. (R. 24.) Even if 
plaintiffs' version of the facts were correct, defendants are not 
aware of any requirement that they wait until the last possible 
moment to file an answer. 
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5/05/95 
5/08/95 
Memorandum: opposition 
to motion (clerk) 
Pleadings - reply to 
motion 
Total 
2.30 
1.25 
9.80 
69.00 
156.25 
$484.00 | 
(R. 124-123.) Plaintiff appealed from the $484.00 award. (R. 160-
159.) 
SUMMARY OF ARGUMENT 
Plaintiffs prevailed on their quiet title claims, but were not 
entitled to an award of attorney fees. Two prior Utah Supreme 
Court decisions establish there is no cause of action for wrongful 
refusal to disclaim an interest in property. 
Defendants prevailed in defending the plaintiffs' claim for 
attorney fees, and were properly awarded their attorney fees 
incurred in the defense. Plaintiffs' claim for attorney fees 
lacked merit, and plaintiffs persisted in the claim in bad faith. 
Defendants should be awarded their fees incurred in responding 
to this appeal. The relief sought is barred by two prior Utah 
Supreme Court decisions, and plaintiffs do not seek to have those 
decisions overruled or modified. The appeal is made in bad faith. 
7 
ARGUMENT 
POINT I 
DEFENDANTS WERE THE PREVAILING PARTIES 
ON THE ATTORNEY FEE ISSUES, AND 
THE AWARD OF FEES IS SUPPORTED BY THE EVIDENCE. 
A. Defendants were the prevailing party on the attorney fee 
issue. 
The trial court awarded attorney fees to defendants based on 
Utah Code Ann. § 78-27-56 (1992), which authorizes an award of fees 
to a prevailing party if the offending claim both lacks merit and 
was made in bad faith. Cady v. Johnson, 671 P.2d 141, 151 (Utah 
1983). 
Section I of plaintiffs' brief argues that plaintiffs, not 
defendants, were the prevailing parties, and that Utah Code Ann. § 
78-27-56 doesn't apply. This is true as to Count I, but not as to 
Count II of plaintiffs7 complaint. The First Cause of Action 
alleged that title should be quieted in plaintiffs. The Second 
Cause of Action alleged that plaintiffs should be awarded attorney 
fees, including attorney fees incurred prior to the filing of the 
complaint. Plaintiffs obtained the relief sought on the first 
cause of action, but defendants were the prevailing party on the 
second cause of action. 
Plaintiffs cite Highland Construction Co. v. Stevenson, 636 
P. 2d 1034 (Utah 1981) , to support their argument that they were the 
prevailing party below. Highland involved a situation where the 
defendant initially denied liability and then, 163 days into the 
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action, voluntarily paid a portion of disputed claim. The case is 
not relevant to this quiet title case where defendants never 
contested plaintiffs' First Cause of Action. Based on Utah Code 
Ann. § 78-40-3 (1992), which prohibits an award of costs under 
these circumstances, it is evident that the legislature intended 
that a non-disputing party in a quiet title action be treated 
differently than a prevailing party in non-quiet-title contested 
civil action. 
Although Highland does not help plaintiffs' prevailing party 
argument, the case does illustrates that there can be two 
prevailing parties in a lawsuit. Highland was an excavating 
subcontractor and performed work on a road project for Stevenson, 
the general contractor. Highland claimed that it was entitled to 
additional compensation by reason of particular adverse soil 
conditions and certain acts of Stevenson and sued to recover that 
additional compensation. Highland also sought recovery of certain 
amounts that were unpaid under the original contract. Stevenson 
counterclaimed to recover extra amounts that Stevenson had to pay 
to complete the work after Highland pulled off the job. Only 164 
days after the lawsuit was filed, Stevenson voluntarily paid 
Highland $10,3 00.78 of the amount Highland was claiming. The case 
proceeded to trial and resulted in a finding that Highland had 
breached its contract and that Stevenson was entitled to recovery 
on its counterclaim. The trial court awarded attorney fees to 
Stevenson, but none to Highland. The Utah Supreme Court affirmed 
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most of the trial court's judgment but remanded for an award of 
attorney fees in favor of Highland, holding that it was the 
prevailing party on one issue, even though Stevenson prevailed on 
its counterclaim. 636 P.2d at 1038. 
Similarly, in the instant case it was proper for the trial 
court to hold that defendants were the prevailing party on the 
second cause of action, even though plaintiffs obtained the relief 
sought on the first cause of action. 
B. Plaintiffs' Claim For Attorney Fees Was Without Merit. 
The gravamen of plaintiffs' appeal is a claim that Janice 
Miller had an obligation to assist plaintiffs in their efforts to 
quiet title to their property, and that she can be held liable for 
failing to execute a quit claim deed. This contention has no merit 
and has been rejected by the Utah Supreme Court on at least two 
occasions. In Draper v. J. B. & R. B. Walker, Inc., 115 Utah 368, 
204 P.2d 826 (1949), the defendant had lawfully recorded a mortgage 
against plaintiff's property, based on a claimed tax title held by 
the mortgagor. The mortgagor's tax title was later held invalid, 
which also had the effect of invalidating the mortgage. Because 
the mortgage still appeared of record, however, it clouded title 
and prevented plaintiff from obtaining a loan which he badly 
needed. Plaintiff expended substantial time and money attempting 
to persuade defendant to release of record the obviously invalid 
mortgage, but defendant refused to do so. Plaintiff then sued, and 
the trial court awarded damages. The Utah Supreme Court reversed, 
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relying on a common law rule that a person has no duty to 
affirmatively disclaim an invalid interest: 
If, however, there is no duty to affirmatively 
act, but only to disclaim in event of suit, 
then no recovery may be had regardless of the 
unreasonableness of the refusal. At the 
common law, no action for damages would lie 
because of a refusal to release a mortgage or 
discharge a lien or claim against property. 
204 P.2d at 829 (citations omitted). 
This rule was more recently reaffirmed by the Utah Supreme 
Court in Jack B. Parson Companies v. Nield, 751 P. 2d 1131 (Utah 
1988). Nield had a recorded interest against property, but the 
interest was worthless because it was junior to a prior mortgage 
and the value of the property was apparently less than the amount 
of the prior mortgage. Nield refused to release his interest of 
record until after he was sued. The trial court awarded damages 
for his failure to clear title to the property, but the Utah 
Supreme Court reversed. The Court stated: 
There is no basis in law for this award. 
Quiet title actions are statutory in nature, 
Holland v. Wilson, 8 Utah 2d 11, 327 P.2d 250 
(1958), and Utah Code Ann. §§ 78-40-1 through 
-13 (1987), authorizing quiet title actions, 
does not include any remedies for refusing to 
release title. 
751 P.2d at 1133. 
The trial court did not rely on these cases, but instead 
relied on the prohibition of an award of costs in Utah Code Ann. § 
78-40-3 (1992) . Plaintiffs claim error, and argue that attorney 
fees are not costs. Plaintiffs apparently argue that attorney fees 
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could be awarded even though the statute prohibits an award of 
costs. Plaintiffs have not cited any case which would support that 
proposition and defendants are not aware of any support for such a 
claim. This Court has previously recognized that "[a]ttorney fees 
are more properly considered costs11 as opposed to damages. Arnica 
Mutual Ins. Co. v. Schettler, 768 P.2d 950, 967 (Utah Ct. App. 
1989). Logic decrees that if the statute prohibits even an award 
of costs, an award of attorney fees would likewise be unavailable. 
The trial court was correct in relying on the statute. 
More importantly, even if the trial court's specific rationale 
was not proper, the trial court's denial of attorney fees should 
still be affirmed if there is another appropriate justification for 
the denial. Jensen v. Bowcut, 892 P.2d 1053, 1058 (Utah Ct. App. 
1995) (trial court's stated ground for award of attorney fees was 
improper, but award was affirmed because alternative grounds 
existed). Nield and Draper provide ample alternative authority for 
the denial of attorney fees, and confirm that plaintiffs' complaint 
and motion for attorney fees were without merit. 
C. There Is Adequate Evidence Of Bad Faith; Any Lack Of 
Sufficient Evidence Is Harmless. 
The trial court's stated ground for the award of attorney fees 
is Utah Code Ann. § 78-27-56 (1992) . An award of attorney fees 
under that statute requires proof that the offending claim both 
lacked merit and was made in bad faith. Cady v. Johnson, 671 P.2d 
141, 151 (Utah 1983). Plaintiffs challenge the trial court's 
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finding that their second cause of action, which sought an award of 
attorney fees, was made in bad faith. The trial court's finding in 
this respect must be affirmed unless clearly erroneous. Jeschke v. 
Willis. 811 P.2d 202, 204 (Utah Ct. App. 1991). 
In Cady, the Utah Supreme Court vacated an award of attorney 
fees where the offending claim was clearly without merit, but the 
only evidence of bad faith was the party's failure to research the 
issue as instructed by the trial court. The trial court concluded 
that adequate research would have disclosed that the claim was 
without merit. 671 P.2d at 152. The Utah Supreme Court held this 
alone was not sufficient evidence of bad faith. Id. The Court 
also approvingly cited a prior case which held that bad faith could 
be shown by evidence of "self-induced myopia." id. (citation 
omitted). 
Application of the bad faith elements articulated in Cady is 
illustrated in Baldwin v. Burton, 850 P.2d 1188 (Utah 1993), which 
found bad faith in the wrongful pursuit of a foreclosure sale 
against real property. Burton had obtained a judgment against Mr. 
Wood just after Mr. Wood had conveyed title to the property to Mrs. 
Wood. Mrs. Wood was Baldwin's predecessor in interest. Even 
though a subsequent title report showed that the judgment lien had 
attached to the property, and even though the literal language of 
the fraudulent conveyance statute gave some support to Burton's 
argument that the Mr. Wood to Mrs. Wood conveyance was void, the 
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Utah Supreme Court affirmed the finding that the foreclosure 
attempt was made in bad faith. 850 P.2d at 1199. 
The evidence of bad faith in the instant case is equally as 
strong as in Baldwin. Defendants' attorney, Craig M. Snyder, 
testified in his affidavit that he had explained to plaintiffs' 
counsel that plaintiffs' claim for attorney fees was without merit 
because defendant Miller had disclaimed any interest in the 
property and had signed a quit claim deed as requested by 
plaintiffs' counsel. (R. 26-23.) Mr. Snyder also explained to 
plaintiffs' counsel that defendants Anderson had never claimed an 
interest in the subject property. Plaintiffs nevertheless 
persisted in pursuing a claim for attorney fees which they had been 
told, and should have known, was groundless. The trial court also 
noted the excessive amount of fees claimed. 
Evidence of bad faith may also be found in subsequent events, 
based on the logic of the cases cited by plaintiffs which permit 
looking at pre-complaint events to determine if post-complaint 
actions were in bad faith. On June 16, 1995, more than a month 
before the trial court's ruling, defendants disclosed the Draper 
case to the court and to plaintiffs. Plaintiffs nonetheless 
continued to persist in their unfounded quest for attorney fees, 
including by filing several objections to the court's order. 
Additional evidence of bad faith is found in the fact that 
plaintiffs have failed, in their filings with this Court, to 
acknowledge the existence of Nield and Draper, both of which are 
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controlling adverse decisions. Utah R. Prof. Con. 3.3(a)(3). The 
trial court properly found that plaintiffs had pursued their 
request for attorney fees in bad faith. 
Even if there is insufficient evidence of bad faith, however, 
the award of attorney fees should still be affirmed. Defendants/ 
counterclaims advanced two alternative bases for an award of 
attorney fees: Utah Code Ann. § 78-27-56, and Utah R. Civ. P. 11. 
Rule 11 does not require a lack of bad faith, only a lack of 
reasonable inquiry. Barnard v. Sutliff, 846 P.2d 1229, 1236 (Utah 
1992) . For the reasons stated elsewhere in this brief, defendants 
submit that the plaintiffs could not have made a reasonable 
inquiry. Although perfect research is not required, id., in none 
of the cases cited by plaintiffs was there an award of pre-
complaint attorney fees. The language of the statute itself only 
authorizes an award of attorney fees incurred "in the action." 
Utah Code Ann. § 78-27-56. Review of the digest headnotes under 
"quieting title" or "libel and slander," both of which were 
relevant to plaintiffs' claim for damages resulting from 
defendants' failure to disclaim title, would have revealed both the 
Draper and the Nield cases, and at a minimum would have revealed 
the lack of any other case authorizing an award of pre-complaint 
attorney fees. Defendants therefore respectfully assert that 
plaintiffs could not have made a reasonable inquiry concerning 
their claimed right to pre-complaint attorney fees. 
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The apparent lack of inquiry in this case is similar to that 
discussed in Backstrom Family Limited Partnership v. Hall, 751 P. 2d 
1157 (Utah Ct. App. 1988), where the court awarded double coasts 
attorney fees on appeal because the attorney should have realized 
that the judgment was not final and appealable. The award of 
attorney fees in the instant case was appropriate and should be 
affirmed. 
POINT II 
PLAINTIFFS WERE NOT ENTITLED TO ATTORNEY FEES 
EVEN THOUGH THEY PREVAILED ON THEIR QUIET TITLE CLAIMS. 
Section II of plaintiffs' brief argues that plaintiffs should 
have been awarded their attorney fees because plaintiffs prevailed 
in quieting title to their property, and because (according to 
plaintiffs) defendant Miller should have acquiesced in plaintiffs7 
earlier demands to sign a quit claim deed. This claim has no 
merit. Two Utah Supreme Court cases establish that there is no 
right of action in Utah for recovery of pre-complaint damages for 
failure to disclaim an interest in property. Jack B. Parson 
Companies v. Nield, 751 P.2d 1131, 1133 (Utah 1988); Draper v. J. 
B. & R. B. Walker, Inc.. 115 Utah 368, 204 P.2d 826, 829 (1949). 
Sound policy arguments support the result of these two cases. 
Under plaintiffs' proposed rule, an individual could repeatedly 
force his or her neighbors to sign quit claim deeds affirming that 
the neighbors claimed no interest in the individual's property. A 
more realistic example might be an individual, whose property was 
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regularly traversed by neighborhood children, requiring each of the 
neighbors to frequently formally disclaim any prescriptive 
easement. If the neighbor refused, the individual could hire an 
attorney to make persuasive and thoroughly researched arguments as 
to why the neighbor had no interest in the individual's property, 
and then expect payment for the attorney fees thus incurred. 
Defendants acknowledge that there are circumstances where a 
neighbor perhaps should sign a quit claim deed. The Utah 
Legislature has, however, provided a speedy and effective remedy 
for any failure to disclaim: filing a quiet title action. Had the 
conduct of which plaintiffs now complain occurred after the filing 
of the complaint, plaintiffs might have had cause to seek attorney 
fees. Because defendants did not resist the quiet title claim in 
plaintiffs' complaint, however, no fees may be awarded. 
The statute on which plaintiffs based their claim, Utah Code 
Ann. § 78-27-56(1), does not permit an award of fees in this 
situation. The statute states: 
In civil actions, the court shall award 
reasonable attorney's fees to a prevailing 
party if the court determines that the action 
or defense to the action was without merit and 
not brought or asserted in good faith . . . . 
(Emphasis added.) 
By its terms, this statute applies only to defenses to an 
action, i.e., a lawsuit. Defendants made no defense to the quiet 
title portion of plaintiffs' action. It follows that the defense 
was not made in bad in faith. 
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This Court need not decide whether there might be some 
situations other than this case where it might be appropriate to 
award attorney fees for work undertaken prior to filing the 
complaint. The Draper and Nield cases establish that such an award 
is not permissible under the facts of this case. 
Section III of plaintiffs' brief claims that there is 
significant precedent and authority elsewhere for an award of pre-
complaint attorney fees. Defendants submit that none of the cases 
cited by plaintiffs support plaintiffs' assertion. In none of the 
cases was an award of pre-complaint attorney fees actually made or 
affirmed. In addition, the only proposition that any of the cases 
might stand for is that pre-complaint actions might be admissible 
as evidence of bad faith and thereby support an award of post-
complaint attorney fees, a proposition which is not at issue in 
this case. 
For example, Hall v. Cole, 412 U.S. 1 (1973), contains no 
indication that any attorney fees were awarded for pre-complaint 
services. The case only holds that the evidence of bad faith may 
be drawn from actions both before and during the lawsuit. 412 U.S. 
at 15. 
Plaintiffs cite Schlank v. Williams, 572 A.2d 101 (D.C. Ct. 
App. 1990) as supporting that a litigant might be entitled to pre-
litigation attorney fees. The case never made such a statement, 
and the statement which plaintiffs apparently refer to was not a 
holding. What the case stated was: "We shall assume, without 
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deciding, that on a proper showing appellant would have been 
entitled to attorneys' fees for the pre-litigation conduct of RSA." 
572 A.2d at 112 (emphasis added). That sentence was preceded by a 
discussion showing that there was a debate among the federal courts 
"over whether the bad faith exception applies to pre-litigation 
conduct." Id (italics in original). It is unclear from Schlank 
and the cases cited in it whether the debate is over pre-complaint 
evidence or pre-complaint attorney fees. What is clear, however, 
is that neither Schlank nor the cases cited in it made any award of 
pre-complaint attorney fees. 
Plaintiffs further claim that "numerous other state courts 
have held that an award of attorney's fees is warranted by xbad 
faith' or ^obduracy' during the pre-litigation time period." 
(Plaintiffs' brief at p. 26.) In support of this proposition, 
plaintiffs cite only two cases, both from New Hampshire. Neither 
case supports awarding pre-complaint attorney fees. 
Harkeem v. Adams, 377 A.2d 617 (N.H. 1977), involved a claim 
that the New Hampshire Department of Employment Security had acted 
in bad faith in opposing the plaintiff's claim for unemployment 
benefits. The trial court found the state had acted in bad faith, 
awarded benefits of $1,104.00, and awarded attorney fees of one-
third the amount of the recovery. Such an award of attorney fees 
for bad faith litigation had not been previously authorized in New 
Hampshire. In Harkeem, the New Hampshire Supreme Court adopted a 
rule authorizing such an award of attorney fees and affirmed the 
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trial court. Although some statements in the opinion might seem to 
support an award of attorney fees "where it should have been 
unnecessary for the successful party to have brought the action," 
377 A.2d at 619 (citation omitted), the comments are dictum because 
the trial court awarded attorney fees based on a percentage of the 
recovery, without respect to when the fees were incurred. One may 
safely assume that the $368.00 in attorney fees did not even 
adequately cover the proceedings during the case itself. 
Griffin v. New Hampshire Department of Employment Security, 
370 A.2d 278 (N.H. 1977) expressly did not decide anything about 
attorney fees. 370 A.2d at 282. That issue was not decided until 
Harkeem. 
In other words, plaintiffs have given no support for their 
claim that "significant precedent and authority" from other 
jurisdictions for an award of pre-litigation attorney fees. 
Plaintiffs have identified only one court which has stated, in 
dictum, that it might award such fees. Plaintiffs do not attempt 
to distinguish, nor even acknowledge the existence of, the two Utah 
Supreme Court cases that squarely hold that a cause of action for 
wrongful refusal to disclaim title is not recognized in Utah. 
POINT III 
DEFENDANTS ARE ENTITLED TO DOUBLE COSTS AND 
ATTORNEY FEES FOR RESPONDING TO THIS APPEAL. 
Rule 33(a) of the Utah Rules of Appellate Procedure mandates 
an award of damages, which may include double costs, if an appeal 
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is frivolous. Subdivision (b) of that rule defines a frivolous 
appeal as one that "is not grounded in fact, not warranted by 
existing law, or not based on a good faith argument to extend, 
modify, or reverse existing law." Defendants respectfully assert 
that this appeal is frivolous and that an award of attorney fees 
and double costs, assessed against appellants' attorney, is 
appropriate. 
Double costs and attorney fees have been awarded against an 
appealing party where the attorney should have discovered, after 
careful consideration, that the appeal lacked merit. Backstrom 
Family Limited Partnership v. Hall, 751 P.2d 1157, 1160 (Utah Ct. 
App. 1988). This Court could reasonably determine that plaintiffs' 
counsel should have discovered the cases cited in Point I of this 
memorandum and thereby learned that this case was without merit. 
The Court does not, however, need to rely on a "should have known" 
analysis. Plaintiffs had actual notice. On June 16, 1995, 
defendants' counsel submitted a letter to the trial court, a copy 
of which was mailed to plaintiffs' attorney, calling the court's 
attention to the Draper case. (Copy of letter attached.) A copy 
of the case was attached to the letter, and the relevant holding 
was quoted in the letter. In addition, both Draper and Nield were 
discussed in detail in defendants' summary disposition memoranda 
filed previously in this appeal. Notwithstanding this actual 
notice that existing Utah law barred plaintiffs' action, plaintiffs 
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have never attempted to distinguish the Draper or Nield cases or to 
argue that they should be modified or reversed. 
Where, as here, the judgment for attorney fees below was based 
on a determination that the action was without merit, the appellate 
court should also award attorney fees on appeal. Utah Department 
of Social Services v. Adams, 806 P. 2d 1193, 1197-98 (Utah Ct. App. 
1991) . Such an award of attorney fees and double costs can be made 
even where there is no showing of bad faith. O'Brien v. Rush, 744 
P.2d 306, 310 (Utah Ct. App. 1987). 
If an award of attorney fees and double costs is required 
where a litigant simply should have known that the action was 
without merit, the award is compelled in this case where 
plaintiffs' attorney had actual knowledge of two controlling cases 
which defeated any right of action. Plaintiffs were required, but 
failed, to acknowledge the existence of those case in arguing for 
summary disposition, because they had not yet been disclosed to 
this Court by opposing counsel. Utah Rules of Professional Conduct 
3.3(a)(3). Defendants are entitled to an award of attorney fees 
and double costs incurred in responding to this appeal. 
CONCLUSION 
The issued raised by appellants have been previously decided. 
Utah does not recognize any cause of action for wrongful refusal to 
disclaim an interest in property. Defendants promptly disclaimed 
any interest in the subject property after plaintiffs' lawsuit was 
filed. Plaintiffs therefore may not recover attorney fees. 
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Plaintiffs' claim for attorney fees had no merit, and 
plaintiffs persisted in pursuing the claim in bad faith. This 
appeal is likewise pursued in bad faith. The judgment of the trial 
court should be affirmed, and defendants should be awarded double 
costs and attorney fees. 
DATED this 7th day of August, 1996. 
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Fourth District Judge 
125 North 100 West 
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Re: CURTIS CHIPMAN and FAY CHIPMAN v. JANICE MILLER et al. 
Case No. 950400145 
Dear Judge Burningham: 
Attached is the case of Draper v. J. B. & R. B. Walker. Inc.. 204 P.2d 826 (Utah 1949) 
which came to my attention after our Memorandum in Opposition to PlaintifPs Cross Motion 
For Attorney Fees and the Plaintiffs Reply Brief had already been submitted. In relevant part, 
Draper. 204 P.2d at 829, states: 
If, however, there is no duty to affirmatively act, but only to disclaim in event 
of suit, then no recovery may be had regardless of the unreasonableness of the 
refusal. At the common law, no action for damages would lie because of a 
refusal to release a mortgage or discharge a lien or claim against property. 
(citations omitted). We are not aware of any statute which would modify the common law rule. 
Thank you for your consideration in this matter. 
Respectfully, 
HOWARD, LEWIS & PETERSEN 
Craig M. Snyder " 
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